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Abstract. We develop a theory for state-based noninterference in a set-
ting where different security policies—we call them local policies—apply
in different parts of a given system. Our theory comprises appropriate
security definitions, characterizations of these definitions, for instance in
terms of unwindings, algorithms for analyzing the security of systems
with local policies, and corresponding complexity results.
1 Introduction
Research in formal security aims to provide rigorous definitions for different no-
tions of security as well as methods to analyse a given system with regard to
the security goals. Restricting the information that may be available to a user
of the system (often called an agent) is an important topic in security. Nonin-
terference [GM82,GM84] is a notion that formalizes this. Noninterference uses
a security policy that specifies, for each pair of agents, whether information is
allowed to flow from one agent to the other. To capture different aspects of in-
formation flow, a wide range of definitions of noninterference has been proposed,
see, e.g., [YB94,Mil90,vO04,WJ90].
In this paper, we study systems where in different parts different policies
apply. This is motivated by the fact that different security requirements may be
desired in different situations, for instance, a user may want to forbid interference
between his web browser and an instant messenger program while visiting bank-
ing sites but when reading a news page, the user may find interaction between
these programs useful.
As an illustrating example, consider the system depicted in Fig. 1, where
three agents are involved: an administrator A and two users H and L. The
rounded boxes represent system states, the arrows represent transitions. The
labels of the states indicate what agent L observes in the respective state; the
labels of the arrows denote the action, either action a performed by A or action
h performed by H , inducing the respective transition. Every action can be per-
formed in every state; if it does not change the state (i. e., if it induces a loop),
the corresponding transition is omitted in the picture.
The lower part of the system constitutes a secure subsystem with respect to
the bottom policy: when agent H performs the action h in the initial state, the
observation of agent L changes from 0 to 1, but this is allowed according to the
policy, as agent H may interfere with agent L—there is an edge from H to L.
Similarly, the upper part of the system constitutes a secure subsystem with
respect to the top policy: interference between H and L is not allowed—no edge
from H to L—and, in fact, there is no such interference, because L’s observation
does not change when h performs an action.
obsL : 0
obsL : 0
obsL : 1
obsL : 0
a
h
h
A H
L
A H
L
Fig. 1. System with local policies
However, the entire system is
clearly insecure: agent Amust not in-
terfere with anyone—there is no edge
starting from A in either policy—but
when L observes “1” in the lower
right state, L can conclude that A did
not perform the a action depicted.
Note that interference between H
and L is allowed, unless A performs
action a. But L must not get to know
whether a was performed. To achieve
this, interference between H and L must never be allowed. Otherwise, as we have
just argued, L can—by observing H ’s actions—conclude that in the current part
of the system, interference between H and L is still legal and thus A did not
perform a. In other words, in the policy of the lower part, the edge connecting
H and L can never be “used” for an actual information flow. We call such edges
useless.—Useless edges are a key issue arising in systems with local policies.
Our results. We develop a theory of noninterference with local policies which
takes the aforementioned issues into account. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We provide new and natural definitions for noninterference with local poli-
cies, both for the transitive [GM82,GM84] (agent L may only be influenced
by agent H if there is an edge from H to L in the policy) and for the in-
transitive setting [HY87] (interference between H and L via “intermediate
steps” is also allowed).
2. We show that policies can always be rewritten into a normal form which
does not contain any “useless” edges (see above).
3. We provide characterizations of our definitions based on unwindings, which
demonstrate the robustness of our definitions and from which we derive
efficient verification algorithms.
4. We provide results on the complexity of verifying noninterference. In the
transitive setting, noninterference can be verified in nondeterministic loga-
rithmic space (NL). In the intransitive setting, the problem is NP-complete,
but fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of agents.
Our results show significant differences between the transitive and the in-
transitive setting. In the transitive setting, one can, without loss of generality,
always assume a policy is what we call uniform, which means that each agent
may “know” (in a precise epistemic sense) the set of agents that currently may
interfere with him. Assuming uniformity greatly simplifies the study of noninter-
ference with local policies in the transitive setting. Moreover, transitive nonin-
terference with local policies can be characterized by a simple unwinding, which
yields very efficient algorithms.
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In the intransitive setting, the situation is more complicated. Policies cannot
be assumed to be uniform, verification is NP-complete, and, consequently, we
only give an unwinding condition that requires computing exponentially many
relations. However, for uniform policies, the situation is very similar to the tran-
sitive setting: we obtain simple unwindings and efficient algorithms.
As a consequence of our results for uniform policies, we obtain an unwind-
ing characterization of IP-security [HY87] (which uses a single policy for the
entire system). Prior to our results, only an unwinding characterization that
was sound, but not complete for IP-security was known [Rus92]. Our new un-
winding characterization immediately implies that IP-security can be verified in
nondeterministic logarithmic space, which improves the polynomial-time result
obtained in [E+11].
Related Work. Our intransitive security definitions generalize IP-security [HY87]
mentioned above. The issues raised against IP-security in [vdM07] are orthogo-
nal to the issues arising from local policies. We therefore study local policies in
the framework of IP-security, which is technically simpler than, e.g., TA-security
as defined in [vdM07].
Several extensions of intransitive noninterference have been discussed, for
instance, in [RG99,MSZ06]. In [Les06], a definition of intransitive noninterference
with local policies is given, however, the definition in [Les06] does not take into
account the aforementioned effects, and that work does not provide complete
unwinding characterizations nor complexity results.
2 State-based Systems with Local Policies
We work with the standard state-observed system model, that is, a system is a
deterministic finite-state automaton where each action belongs to a dedicated
agent and each agent has an observation in each state. More formally, a system
is a tuple M = (S, s0, A, step, obs, dom), where S is a finite set of states, s0 ∈ S
is the initial state, A is a finite set of actions, step : S × A → S is a transition
function, obs : S×D → O is an observation function, where O is an arbitrary set
of observations, and dom : A→ D associates with each action an agent, where D
is an arbitrary finite set of agents (or security domains).
For a state s and an agent u, we write obsu(s) instead of obs(s, u). For
a sequence α ∈ A∗ of actions and a state s ∈ S, we denote by s · α the state
obtained when performing α starting in s, i.e., s ·ǫ = s and s ·αa = step(s ·α, a).
A local policy is a reflexive relation֌ ⊆ D×D. To keep our notation simple,
we do not define subsystems nor policies for subsystems explicitly. Instead, we
assign a local policy to every state and denote the policy in state s by ֌s.
We call the collection of all local policies (֌s)s∈S the policy of the system. If
(u, v) ∈ ֌s for some u, v ∈ D, s ∈ S, we say u ֌s v is an edge in (֌s)s∈S .
A system has a global policy if all local policies ֌s are the same in all states,
i.e., if u֌s v does not depend on s. In this case, we denote the single policy by
֌ and only write u ֌ v. We define the set u֋s as the set of agents that may
interfere with u in s, i.e., the set {v | v֌s u}.
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In the following, we fix an arbitrary system M and a policy (֌s)s∈S .
In our examples, we often identify a state with an action sequence leading to
it from the initial state s0, that is, we write α for s0 · α, which is well-defined,
because we consider deterministic systems. For example, in the system from
Fig. 1, we denote the initial state by ǫ and the upper right state by ah. In
each state, we write the local policy in that state as a graph. In the system
from Fig. 1, we have H ֌ǫ L, but H 6֌a L. In general, we only specify the
agents’ observations as far as relevant for the example, which usually is only the
observation of the agent L. We adapt the notation from Fig. 1 to our definition
of local policies, which assigns a local policy to every state: we depict the graph
of the local policy inside the rounded box for the state, see Fig. 2.
3 The Transitive Setting
In this section, we define noninterference for systems with local policies in the
transitive setting, give several characterizations, introduce the notion of useless
edge, and discuss it. The basic idea of our security definition is that an occurrence
of an action which, according to a local policy, should not be observable by an
agent u must not have any influence on u’s future observations.
Definition 3.1 (t-security). The system M is t-secure iff for all u ∈ D, s ∈ S,
a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ the following implication holds:
If dom(a) 6֌s u, then obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · aα) .
A B
L
obsL : 0
A B
L
obsL : 1
A B
L
obsL : 2
b
a
ba
Fig. 2. A t-secure system
Fig. 2 shows a t-secure system. In contrast, the
system in Fig. 1 is not t-secure, since A 6֌ǫ L, but
obsL(ah) 6= obsL(h).
3.1 Characterizations of t-Security
In Theorem 3.4, we give two characterizations of t-
security, underlining that our definition is quite ro-
bust. The first characterization is based on an op-
erator which removes all actions that must not be
observed. It is essentially the definition from Goguen
and Meseguer [GM82,GM84] of the purge operator generalized to systems with
local policies.
Definition 3.2 (purge for local policies). For all u ∈ D and s ∈ S let
purge(ǫ, u, s) = ǫ and for all a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ let
purge(aα, u, s) =
{
a purge(α, u, s · a) if dom(a)֌s u
purge(α, u, s) otherwise .
The other characterization is in terms of unwindings, which we define for local
policies in the following, generalizing the definition of Haigh and Young [HY87].
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Definition 3.3 (transitive unwinding with local policies). A transitive
unwinding for M with a policy (֌s)s∈S is a family of equivalence relations
(∼u)u∈D such that for every agent u ∈ D, all states s, t ∈ S and all a ∈ A, the
following holds:
– If dom(a) 6֌s u, then s ∼u s · a. (LRt)—local respect
– If s ∼u t, then s · a ∼u t · a. (SCt)—step consistency
– If s ∼u t, then obsu(s) = obsu(t). (OCt)—output consistency
Our characterizations of t-security are spelled out in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 (characterizations of t-security). The following are equiva-
lent:
1. The system M is t-secure.
2. For all u ∈ D, s ∈ S, and α, β ∈ A∗ with purge(α, u, s) = purge(β, u, s), we
have obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · β).
3. There exists a transitive unwinding for M with the policy (֌s)s∈S.
Unwinding relations yield efficient verification procedure. For verifying t-
security, it is sufficient to compute for every u ∈ D the smallest equivalence
relation satisfying (LRt) and (SCt) and check that the function obsu is constant
on every equivalence class. This can be done with nearly the same algorithm
as is used for global policies, described in [E+11]. The above theorem directly
implies that t-security can be verified in nondeterministic logarithmic space.
3.2 Useless Edges
An “allowed” interference v ֌s u may contradict a “forbidden” interference
v 6֌s′ u in a state s′ that should be indistinguishable to s for u. In this case, the
edge v ֌s u is useless. What this means is that an edge v ֌s u in the policy
may be deceiving and should not be interpreted as “it is allowed that v interferes
with u”, rather, it should be interpreted as “it is not explicitly forbidden that v
interferes with u”. To formalize this, we introduce the following notion:
Definition 3.5 (t-similarity). States s, s′ are t-similar for an agent u ∈ D,
denoted s ≈u s′, if there exist t ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ such that dom(a) 6֌t u,
s = t · aα, and s′ = t · α.
Observe that t-similarity is identical with the smallest equivalence relation sat-
isfying (LRt) and (SCt). Also observe that the system M is t-secure if and only
if for every agent u, if s ≈u s′, then obsu(s) = obsu(s′).
The notion of t-similarity allows us to formalize the notion of a useless edge:
Definition 3.6 (useless edge). An edge v֌s u is useless if there is a state s
′
with s ≈u s′ and v 6֌s′ u.
For example, consider again the system in Fig. 1. Here, the local policy in
the initial state allows information flow from H to L. However, if L is allowed
to observe H ’s action in the initial state, then L would know that the system is
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in the initial state, and would also know that A has not performed an action.
This is an information flow from A to L, which is prohibited by the policy.
Useless edges can be removed without any harm:
Theorem 3.7 (removal of useless edges). Let (֌′s)s∈S be defined by
֌′s =֌s \ {v֌s u | v֌s u is useless} for all s ∈ S.
Then M is t-secure w. r. t. (֌s)s∈S iff M is t-secure w. r. t. (֌
′
s)s∈S.
The policy (֌′s)s∈S in Theorem 3.7 has no useless edges, hence every edge
in one of its local policies represents an allowed information flow—no edge con-
tradicts an edge in another local policy. Another interpretation is that any in-
formation flow that is forbidden is directly forbidden via the absence of the
corresponding edge. In that sense, the policy is closed under logical deduction.
We call a policy (֌s)s∈S uniform if u
֋
s = u
֋
s′ holds for all states s and s
′
with s ≈u s′. In other words, in states that u should not be able to distinguish,
the exact same set of agents may interfere with u. Hence u may “know” the set
of agents that currently may interfere with him. Note that a policy is uniform
if and only if it does not contain useless edges. (This is not true in the intransi-
tive setting, hence the seemingly complicated definition of uniformity.) Uniform
policies have several interesting properties, for example, with a uniform policy
the function purge behaves very similarly to the setting with a global policy:
it suffices to verify action sequences that start in the initial state of the system
and purge satisfies a natural associativity condition on a uniform policy.
4 The Intransitive Setting
In this section, we consider the intransitive setting, where, whenever an agent
performs an action, this event may transmit information about the actions the
agent has performed himself as well as information about actions by other agents
that was previously transmitted to him. The definition follows a similar pattern
as that of t-security: if performing an action sequence aα starting in a state s
should not transmit the action a (possibly via several intermediate steps) to the
agent u, then u should be unable to deduce from his observations whether a
was performed. To formalize this, we use Leslie’s extension [Les06] of Rushby’s
definition [Rus92] of sources.
Definition 4.1 (sources). For an agent u let src(ǫ, u, s) = {u} and for a ∈ A,
α ∈ A∗, if dom(a) ֌s v for some v ∈ src(α, u, s · a), then let src(aα, u, s) =
src(α, u, s · a) ∪ {dom(a)}, and else let src(aα, u, s) = src(α, u, s · a).
The set src(aα, u, s) contains the agents that “may know” whether the ac-
tion a has been performed in state s after the run aα is performed: initially, this
is only the set of agents v with dom(a)֌s v. The knowledge may be spread by
every action performed by an agent “in the know:” if an action b is performed in a
later state t, and dom(b) already may know that the action a was performed, then
all agents v with dom(b)֌t v may obtain this information when b is performed.
Following the discussion above, we obtain a natural definition of security:
6
Definition 4.2 (i-security). The system M is i-secure iff for all s ∈ S, a ∈ A,
and α ∈ A∗, the following implication holds.
If dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s), then obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α).
The definition formalizes the above: if, on the path aα, the action a is not
transmitted to u, then u’s observation must not depend on whether a was per-
formed; the runs aα and α must be indistinguishable for u.
Consider the example in Fig. 1. The system remains insecure in the intran-
sitive setting: as A must not interfere with any agent in any state, we have
dom(a) /∈ src(ah, L, ǫ), where again, according to our convention, ǫ denotes the
initial state. So, the system is insecure, since obsL(ah) 6= obsL(h).
4.1 Characterizations and Complexity of i-Security
We now establish two characterizations of intransitive noninterference with local
policies and study the complexity of verifying i-security. Our characterizations
are analogous to the ones obtained for the transitive setting in Theorem 3.4.
The first one is based on a purge function, the second one uses an unwinding
condition. This demonstrates the robustness of our definition and strengthens
our belief that i-security is indeed a natural notion.
We first extend Rushby’s definition of ipurge to systems with local policies.
Definition 4.3 (intransitive purge for local policies). For all u ∈ D and
all s ∈ S, let ipurge(ǫ, u, s) = ǫ and, for all a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗, let
ipurge(aα, u, s) =
{
a ipurge(α, u, s · a) if dom(a) ∈ src(aα, u, s),
ipurge(α, u, s) otherwise.
The crucial point is that in the case where amust remain hidden from agent u,
we define ipurge(aα, u, s) as ipurge(α, u, s) instead of the possibly more intu-
itive choice ipurge(α, u, s·a), on which the security definition in [Les06] is based.
We briefly explain the reasoning behind this choice. To this end, let ipurge′
denote the alternative definition of ipurge outlined above. Consider the sequence
ah, performed from the initial state in the system in Fig. 1. Clearly, the action a
is purged from the trace, thus the result of ipurge′ is the same as applying
ipurge′ to the sequence h starting in the upper left state. However, in this
state, the action h is invisible for L, hence ipurge′ removes it, and thus purging
ah results in the empty sequence. On the other hand, if we consider the sequence
h also starting in the initial state, then h is not removed by ipurge′, since H
may interfere with L. Hence ah and h do not lead to the same purged trace—
a security definition based on ipurge′ does not require ah and h to lead to
states with the same observation. Therefore, the system is considered secure in
the ipurge′-based security definition from [Les06]. However, a natural definition
must require ah and h to lead to the same observation for agent L, as the action
a must always be hidden from L.
We next define unwindings for i-security and then give a characterization of
i-security based on them.
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Definition 4.4 (intransitive unwinding). An intransitive unwinding for the
system M with a policy (֌s)s∈S is a family of relations (-D′)D′⊆D such that
-D′⊆ S × S and for all D
′ ⊆ D, all s, t ∈ S and all a ∈ A, the following hold:
– s -{u∈D | dom(a) 6֌su} s · a. (LRi)
– If s -D′′ t, then s · b -D′′ t · b, where D′′ = D′ if dom(b) ∈ D′,
and else D′′ = D′ ∩ {u | dom(b) 6֌s u}. (SCi)
– If s -D′ t and u ∈ D′, then obsu(s) = obsu(t), (OCi)
Intuitively, s -D′ t expresses that there is a common reason for all agents
in D′ to have the same observations in s as in t, i.e., if there is a state s˜, an
action a and a sequence α such that s = s˜·aα, t = s˜·α, and dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s˜)
for all agents u ∈ D′.
Theorem 4.5 (characterization of i-security). The following are equiva-
lent:
1. The system M is i-secure.
2. For all agents u, all states s, and all action sequences α and β with
ipurge(α, u, s) = ipurge(β, u, s), we have obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · β).
3. There exists an intransitive unwinding for M and (֌s)s∈S .
In contrast to the transitive setting, the unwinding characterization of i-
security does not lead to a polynomial-time algorithm to verify security of a
system, because the number of relations needed to consider is exponential in
the number of agents in the system. Unless P = NP, we cannot do significantly
better, because the verification problem is NP-complete; our unwinding charac-
terization, however, yields an FPT-algorithm.
Theorem 4.6 (complexity of i-security). Deciding whether a given system
is i-secure with respect to a policy is NP-complete and fixed-parameter tractable
with the number of agents as parameter.
4.2 Intransitively Useless Edges
H
D
obsL : 0
H D
L
obsL : 0
obsL : 1
D
L
obsL : 0
obsL : 2
obsL : 0obsL : 0
h1
h2
d
d
h1
h2
Fig. 3. Intransitively useless edge
In our discussion of t-security we observed
that local policies may contain edges that
can never be used. This issue also occurs
in the intransitive setting, but the situ-
ation is more involved. In the transitive
setting, it is sufficient to “remove any in-
coming edge for u that u must not know
about” (see Theorem 3.7). In the intran-
sitive setting it is not: when the system in
Fig. 3 is in state h1, then agent L must
not know that the edgeD֌ L is present,
since states ǫ and h1 should be indistinguishable for L, but clearly, the edge can-
not be removed without affecting security. However, useless edges still exist in
the intransitive setting, even in the system from Figure 3, as we will show below.
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To formally define useless edges, we adapt t-similarity to the intransitive
setting in the natural way.
Definition 4.7 (i-similarity). For an agent u, let ≈iu be the smallest equiv-
alence relation on the states of M such that for all s ∈ S, a ∈ A, α ∈ A∗, if
dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s), then s · aα ≈iu s · α. We call states s and s
′ with s ≈iu s
′
i-similar for u.
Using this, we can now define intransitively useless edges:
Definition 4.8 (intransitively useless edge). Let e be an edge in a local
policy of (֌s)s∈S and let (֌ˆs)s∈S be the policy obtained from (֌s)s∈S by
removing e. Let ≈iu and ≈ˆ
i
u be the respective i-similarity relations. Then e is
intransitively useless if s ≈iu s
′ if and only if s≈ˆius
′ for all states s and s′ and
all agents u.
An edge is intransitively useless if removing it does not forbid any information
flow that was previously allowed. In particular, such an edge itself cannot be used
directly. Whether an edge is useless does not depend on the observation function
of the system, but only on the policy and the transition function, whereas a
definition of security compares observations in different states.
If the policy does not contain any intransitively useless edges, then there is
no edge in any of its local policies that is contradicted by other aspects of the
policy. In other words, the set of information flows forbidden by such a policy
is closed under logical deduction—every edge that can be shown to represent a
forbidden information flow is absent in the policy.
Fig. 3 shows a secure system with an intransitively useless edge. The system
is secure (agent L knows whether in the initial state, h1 or h2 was performed,
as soon as this information is transmitted by agent D). The edge H ֌h1 L is
intransitively useless, as explained in what follows.
The edge allows L to distinguish between the states h1, h1h1, h1h2. However,
one can verify that h2h1 ≈iL h1, h2h1h1 ≈
i
L h2h1, h2h1h1 ≈
i
L h1h1, h2h1h2 ≈
i
L
h2h1, and h2h1h2 ≈iL h1h2 all hold. Symmetry and transitivity of ≈
i
L imply that
all the three states h1, h1h1, h1h2 are ≈iL-equivalent. Hence the edge H ֌h1 L
is indeed intransitively useless (and the system would be insecure if h1, h1h1,
and h1h2 would not have the same observations).
Intransitively useless edges can be removed without affecting security:
Theorem 4.9 (removal of intransitively useless edges). Let (֌′s)s∈S be
obtained from (֌s)s∈S by removing a set of edges which are intransitively use-
less. Then M is i-secure with respect to (֌s)s∈S if and only if M is i-secure
with respect to (֌′s)s∈S.
This theorem implies that for every policy (֌s)s∈S , a policy (֌
′
s)s∈S with-
out intransitively useless edges that is equivalent to (֌s)s∈S can be obtained
from (֌s)s∈S by removing all intransitively useless edges.
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4.3 Sound Unwindings and Uniform Intransitive Policies
The exponential size unwinding of i-security given in Section 4.1 does not yield
a polynomial-time algorithm for security verification. Since the problem is NP-
complete, such an algorithm—and hence an unwinding that is both small and
easy to compute—does not exist, unless P = NP. In this section, we define
unwinding conditions that lead to a polynomial-size unwinding and are sound
for i-security, and are sound and complete for i-secure in the case of uniform
policies. Uniform policies are (as in the transitive case) policies in which every
agent “may know” the set of agents who may currently interfere with him, that
is, if an agent u must not distinguish two states by the security definition, then
the set of agents that may interfere with u must be identical in these two states.
Formally, we define this property as follows.
Definition 4.10 (intransitive uniform). A policy (֌s)s∈S is intransitively
uniform, if for all agents u and states s, s′ with s ≈iu s
′, we have that u֋s = u
֋
s′ .
Note that this definition is very similar to the uniformity condition for the
transitive setting, but while in the transitive setting, uniform policies and policies
without useless edges coincide, this is not true for intransitive noninterference
(in fact, neither implication holds).
Uniformity, on an abstract level, is a natural requirement and often met in
concrete systems, since an agent usually knows the sources of information avail-
able to him. In the uniform setting, many of the subtle issues with local poli-
cies do not occur anymore; as an example, i-security and the security definition
from [Les06] coincide for uniform policies. Uniformity also has nice algorithmic
properties, as both, checking whether a system has a uniform policy and check-
ing whether a system with a uniform policy satisfies i-security, can be performed
in polynomial time. This follows from the characterizations of i-security in terms
of the unwindings we define next.
Definition 4.11 (uniform intransitive unwinding). A uniform intransitive
unwinding for M with a policy (֌s)s∈S is a family of equivalence relations ∼
s˜,v
u
for each choice of states s˜ and agents v and u, such that for all s, t ∈ S, and all
a ∈ A, the following holds:
– If s ∼s˜,vu t, then obsu(s) = obsu(t). (OC
u
i )
– If s ∼s˜,vu t, then u
֋
s = u
֋
t . (PC
u
i )
– If s ∼s˜,vu t and a ∈ A with v 6֌s˜ dom(a), then s · a ∼
s˜,v
u t · a. (SC
u
i )
– If dom(a) 6֌s˜ u, then s˜ ∼
s˜,dom(a)
u s˜ · a. (LRui )
In the following theorem intransitive uniformity and i-security (for uniform
policies) are characterized by almost exactly the same unwinding. The only dif-
ference is that for uniformity we require policy consistency (PCui ), since we are
concerned with having the same local policies in certain states, while for security,
we require (OCui ), since we are interested in observations.
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Theorem 4.12 (uniform unwinding characterizations).
1. The policy (֌s)s∈S is intransitively uniform if and only if there is a uniform
intransitive unwinding for M and (֌s)s∈S that satisfies (PC
u
i ), (SC
u
i ), and
(LRui ).
2. If (֌s)s∈S is intransitively uniform, then M is i-secure if and only if there
is a uniform intransitive unwinding that satisfies (OCui ), (SC
u
i ) and (LR
u
i ).
In particular, if an unwinding satisfying all four conditions exists, then a sys-
tem is secure. Due to Theorem 4.6, we cannot hope that the above unwindings
completely characterize i-security, and indeed the system in Fig. 3 is i-secure but
not intransitively uniform. However, for uniform policies, Theorem 4.12 immedi-
ately yields efficient algorithms to verify the respective conditions via a standard
dynamic programming approach:
Corollary 4.13 (uniform unwinding verification).
1. Verifying whether a policy is intransitively uniform can be performed in non-
deterministic logarithmic space.
2. For systems with intransitively uniform policies, verifying whether a system
is i-secure can be performed in nondeterministic logarithmic space.
The above shows that the complexity of intransitive noninterference with
local policies comes from the combination of local policies that do not allow
agents to “see” their allowed sources of information with an intransitive security
definition. In the transitive setting, this interplay does not arise, since there a
system always can allow agents to “see” their incoming edges (see Theorem 3.7).
4.4 Unwinding for IP-Security
In the setting with a global policy, i-security is equivalent to IP-security as
defined in [HY87]. For IP-security, Rushby gave unwinding conditions that are
sufficient, but not necessary. This left open the question whether there is an
unwinding condition that exactly characterizes IP-security, which we can now
answer positively as follows. Clearly, a policy that assigns the same local policy
to every state is intransitively uniform. Hence our results immediately yield a
characterization of IP-security with the above unwinding conditions, and from
these, an algorithm verifying IP-security in nondeterministic logarithmic space
can be obtained in the straight-forward manner.
Corollary 4.14 (unwinding for IP-security).
1. A system is IP-secure if and only if it has an intransitive unwinding satisfying
(OCui ), (SC
u
i ), and (LR
u
i ).
2. IP-security can be verified in nondeterministic logarithmic space.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that noninterference with local policies is considerably different
from noninterference with a global policy: an allowed interference in one state
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may contradict a forbidden interference in another state. Our new definitions
address this issue. Our purge- and unwinding-based characterizations show that
our definitions are natural, and directly lead to our complexity results.
We have studied generalizations of Rusby’s IP-security [Rus92]. An interest-
ing question is to study van der Meyden’s TA-security [vdM07] in a setting with
local policies. Preliminary results indicate that such a generalization needs to
use a very different approach from the one used in this paper.
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6 Additional Results
In this Section we present and prove additional results which were informally
mentioned in the main paper.
6.1 Initial-State Verification Suffices for Uniform Policies
One noteworthy difference to the case of a system with a global policy is that it
is necessary to evaluate the purge-function in every state, and not only in the
initial state: The system in Figure 4 is secure with respect to the purge-based
characterization of t-security, if we only consider traces starting in the initial
state, but can easily be seen to not be t-secure.
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
H1 H2
L
obsL : 0
H1 H2
L
obsL : 1
H1 H2
L
obsL : 1
h1
h2
h2
Fig. 4. System with a non-uniform policy
However, in the case of a uniform policy, it suffices to consider traces starting
in the initial state, as we now show.
Theorem 6.1. Let M be a system with a uniform policy. Then M is t-secure
iff for all u ∈ D and all α ∈ A∗: obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · purge(α, u, s0)).
Proof. Assume thatM is a secure system. Then from s0 ·α ∼u s0 ·purge(α, u, s0)
follows from the output consistency that obsu(s0 ·α) = obsu(s0 ·purge(α, u, s0)).
For the other direction of the proof, we consider α, β ∈ A∗ with purge(α, u, s)
= purge(β, u, s). Then it exists γ ∈ A∗ with s = s0 · γ. It follows that s0 · γ ∼u
purge(γ, u, s0). This gives
obsu(s · α) = obsu(s0 · γα)
= obsu(s0 · purge(γα, u, s0))
= obsu(s0 · purge(γ, u, s0)purge(α, u, s0 · purge(γ, u, s0)))
= obsu(s0 · purge(γ, u, s0)purge(α, u, s0 · γ))
= obsu(s0 · purge(γ, u, s0)purge(β, u, s0 · γ))
= obsu(s0 · β) .

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6.2 Some Properties of the purge Function
Here we show that our purge function in the transitive setting behaves very
naturally in the case of a uniform policy.
Lemma 6.2. Let M be a system with a policy (֌s)s∈S . For every u ∈ D,
s, t ∈ S and α, β ∈ A∗, we have
1. purge(purge(α, u, s), u, s) = purge(α, u, s),
2. purge(αβ, u, s) = purge(α, u, s)purge(β, u, s · purge(α, u, s)),
3. if (֌s)s∈S is uniform and if ∼u is an equivalence relation on S that sat-
isfies (LRt) and (SCt) and if s ∼u t, then s · α ∼u t · purge(α, u, t) and
purge(α, u, s) = purge(α, u, t).
Proof. 1. We show this by an induction on the length of α. Since the base case
is obvious, we proceed with the inductive step. We consider aα with a ∈ A
and α ∈ A∗ and assume that the claim holds for α. In the following two
cases, we get
(a) If dom(a)֌s u, we have
purge(purge(aα, u, s), u, s) = purge(apurge(α, u, s · a), us)
= apurge(purge(α, u, s · a), u, s · a)
I.H.
= apurge(α, u, s · a)
= purge(aα, u, s) .
(b) If dom(a) 6֌s u, we have
purge(purge(aα, u, s), u, s) = purge(purge(α, u, s), u, s)
I.H.
= purge(α, u, s) .
2. We show this claim by an induction on the length of α and consider again
aα. We get the following two cases
(a) If dom(a)֌s u, we have
purge(aαβ, u, s) = apurge(αβ, u, s · a)
I.H.
= apurge(α, u, s · a)purge(β, u, s · apurge(α, u, s · a))
= purge(aα, u, s)purge(β, u, s · purge(aα, u, s)) .
(b) If dom(a) 6֌s u, we have
purge(aαβ, u, s) = purge(αβ, u, s)
I.H.
= purge(α, u, s)purge(β, u, s · purge(α, u, s))
= purge(aα, u, s)purge(β, u, s · purge(aα, u, s)) .
3. This can be shown by an induction on the length of α.

14
6.3 Equivalence of Intransitive Security Definitions for Uniform
Policies
We now show that in case of an intransitively uniform policy, a system is secure
with respect to the definition of [Les06] if and only if it is i-secure.
We first show the following Lemma, which intuitively says that if the first
action of aα is not transmitted to u on the path aα, then the same actions on
the remaining path α are transmitted to u when evaluating α from the state s
or from the state s · a in the case of a uniform policy. This is the key reason
why, for uniform policies, the difference between Leslie’s function ipurge′ and
our ipurge is irrelevant.
Lemma 6.3. Let M be a system with an intransitively uniform policy (֌s)s∈S.
Let dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s), where α = βbβ′. Then
dom(b) ∈ src(bβ′, u, s · β) iff dom(b) ∈ src(bβ′, u, s · aβ).
Proof. Assume this is not the case, and let bβ′ be a minimal counter-example.
First assume that dom(b) ∈ src(bβ′, u, s · aβ) and dom(b) /∈ src(bβ′, u, s · β).
Then there is some dom(c) ∈ src(β′, u, s · aβb) with dom(b) ֌s·aβ dom(c), and
due to minimality of bβ′ it follows that dom(c) ∈ src(β′, u, s ·βb). Since dom(b) /∈
src(bβ′, u, s ·β), it thus follows that dom(b) 6֌s·β dom(c). This is a contradiction
to the intransitive uniformity of (֌s)s∈S , since dom(a) /∈ src(aβ, dom(c), s), and
hence s · aβ ≈i
dom(c) s · β.
The second case is essentially identical: Assume that dom(b) ∈ src(bβ′, u, s·β)
and dom(b) /∈ src(bβ′, u, s · aβ). Then there is some dom(c) ∈ src(β′, u, s · βb)
with dom(b)֌s·β dom(c). Due to the minimality of bβ
′, it follows that dom(c) ∈
src(β′, u, s ·aβb), hence dom(b) 6֌s·aβ dom(c). Since s ·aβ ≈idom(c) s ·β due to the
above, we have a contradiction to the uniformity of (֌s)s∈S . 
From the above Lemma, we can now easily show that for uniform policies,
i-security and security in the sense of [Les06] coincide:
Theorem 6.4. Let M be a system with an intransitively uniform policy (֌s
)s∈S. Then M is i-secure if and only if M is secure with respect to the definition
in [Les06].
Proof. Due to Theorem 4.5, it suffices to show that in the case of a uniform
policy, the functions ipurge and ipurge′ coincide. Assume indirectly that this
is not the case, and let α be a minimal sequence such that there exists a state
s and an agent u with ipurge(α, u, s) 6= ipurge′(α, u, s). Clearly α 6= ǫ, hence
assume that α = aα′.
First assume that dom(a) ∈ src(aα′, u, s). In this case, we have (by definition
and minimality of α), that
ipurge(aα′, u, s) = a ipurge(α′, u, s · a)
= ipurge′(α′, u, s · a) = ipurge(aα′, u, s) ,
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which is a contradiction to the choice of α.
Hence assume that dom(a) /∈ src(aα′, u, s). By definition, it follows that
ipurge(aα′, u, s) = ipurge(α′, u, s) and ipurge′(aα′, u, s) = ipurge′(α′, u, s ·
a) = ipurge(α′, u, s · a) (the final equaility is due to the minimality of α).
It hence suffices to show that ipurge(α′, u, s) = ipurge(α′, u, s · a). This
easily follows by induction on Lemma 6.3: The same actions of α′ are transmitted
to u when evaluating α′ starting in the state s and in s · a. 
7 Proofs
In this section we give proofs for the results claimed in the paper.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. First, we will show that 1. implies 3.. Let M be a t-secure system. Let
u ∈ D. Define for every s, t ∈ S:
s ∼u t iff for all α ∈ A
∗ : obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α) .
The condition (OCt) is satisfied if α = ǫ. For the condition (SCt), we consider
s, t ∈ S with s ∼u t and let a ∈ A. Then for all α ∈ A
∗, we have s · α ∼u t · α
and also s · aα ∼u t · aα. Therefore, s · a ∼u t · a. For the condition (LRt), we
consider a ∈ A and s ∈ S with dom(a) 6֌s u. Since s is a reachable state, it
exists α ∈ A∗ with s = s0 · α. The definition of t-security states, that for every
β ∈ A∗ the equality of obsu(s · aβ) and obsu(s · β) holds. Therefore, s ∼u s · a.
We assume that 3. holds and will proof 2.. Let u ∈ D and assume that
there exists a transitive unwinding ∼u that satisfies (LRt), (SCt) and (OCt).
We will show by an induction on the combined length of α and β, that for every
state s ∈ S: purge(α, u, s) = purge(β, u, s) implies s · α ∼u s · β. The base
case with α = β = ǫ is clear. For the inductive step consider α and β with
purge(α, u, s) = purge(β, u, s) for some state s. We have to consider two cases:
Case 1: α = aα′ for some a ∈ A, α′ ∈ A∗ and dom(a) 6֌s u. Then we have
purge(aα′, u, s) = purge(α′, u, s). From the property (LRt) follows that
s ∼u s ·a and from (LRt) follows s ·α′ ∼u s ·aα′. Applying the induction
hypothesis gives s · α′ ∼u s · β which can be combined to s · α ∼u s · β.
Case 2: α = aα′ and β = bβ′ with dom(a)֌s u and dom(b)֌s u. From
a purge(α′, u, s · a) = purge(aα′, u, s)
= purge(α, u, s)
= purge(β, u, s)
= b purge(β′, u, s · b)
follows that a = b and purge(α′, u, s · a) = purge(β′, u, s · a). Applying
the induction hypothesis gives s · aα′ ∼u s · bβ′.
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In both cases follows from (OCt) that obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · β).
For proofing the implication from 2 to 1, we assume, thatM does not satisfy t-
security. Therefore, there exists an agent u ∈ D and states s, s′ ∈ S with s ≈u s
′
and obsu(s) 6= obsu(s′). By the definition of t-security, there exists t ∈ S, a ∈ A
and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) 6֌t u, s = t ·aα and s′ = t ·α. By applying of purge, we
have purge(aα, u, t) = purge(α, u, t) and from obsu(t ·aα) 6= obsu(t ·α), follows
that 2 does not hold.
For proofing the missing implication, we assume that 1. does not hold. There-
fore, it exists u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ with dom(a) 6֌s u and
obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). Therefore, s · aα ≈u s · α and 1 does not hold. 
7.2 Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof. Let M be a t-secure system with respect to the policy (֌s)s∈S . Then
there exists a transitive unwinding (∼u)u∈D for M . Note, that for every u ∈ D,
the smallest eqivalence relation ∼u that satisfies (LRt) and (SCt) is equal to the
smallest equivalence relation on S that includes ≈u. Let ∼′u be the a smallest
equivalence relation that satisfies (SCt) and (LRt) with respect to the policy
(֌′s)s∈S . We will show that ∼
′
u ⊆ ∼u. Let s, t ∈ S with s ∼
′
u t and t = s · a
form some a ∈ A with dom(a) 6֌′s u. Therefore, there exists s
′ ∈ S with s′ ∼u s
and dom(a) 6֌s′ u. From s′ ∼u s′ · a and s′ · a ∼u s · a follows s ∼u t.
The other direction of the proof follows directly from the fact, that the policy
(֌′s)s∈S is at least as restrictive as the policy (֌s)s∈S . 
7.3 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof. We first consider the ipurge-characterization and then the intransitive
unwinding characterization.
1. We first show that i-security implies the ipurge-characterization. Hence in-
directly assume that the system is i-secure, and indirectly assume that the
ipurge-condition is not satisfied. Then there exists a state s, an agent u, and
sequences α and β with ipurge(α, u, s) = ipurge(β, u, s), and obsu(s ·α) 6=
obsu(s ·β). We choose α and β such that |α|+ |β| is minimal among all such
examples. Clearly, if both α and β start with an action that is transmitted to
u, then this action must be the same: If α = aα′ with dom(a) ∈ src(aα′, u, s)
and β = bβ′ with dom(b) ∈ src(bβ′, u, s), then ipurge(α, u, s) starts with a,
and ipurge(β, u, s) starts with b. It thus follows that a = b, and hence we
could use the state s′ = s·a and the sequences α′ and β′ as a counter-example,
which contradicts the minimality of α and β. Hence we can, without loss of
generality, assume that α = aα′ for some a with dom(a) /∈ src(aα′, u, s). It
thus follows that ipurge(α′, u, s) = ipurge(α, u, s) = ipurge(β, u, s). Since
the system is secure, we also have obsu(s ·α′) = obsu(s ·aα′) = obsu(s ·α) 6=
obsu(s · β), and hence we again obtain a contradiction to the minimality of
α and β (with choosing α′ instead of α).
We now show the converse, i.e., that the ipurge-characterization implies
i-security. Hence assume that the system satisfies the ipurge-condition. To
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show interference security, let dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s) for some agent u and
state s, we show that obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α). Note that since dom(a) /∈
src(aα, u, s), it follows that ipurge(aα, u, s) = ipurge(α, u, s). Hence from
the prerequisites of the theorem it follows that obsu(s · aα) = obsu(s · α) as
required.
2. We prove that the intransitive unwinding characterization is also equivalent
to i-security. First assume that there is an intransitive unwinding (-D′)D′⊆D
for M with respect to (֌s)s∈S . We show that the system is i-secure. For
this it suffices to show that if dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s), then s ·aα -D′ s ·α for
some set D′ with u ∈ D′. For each prefix α′ of α, let Dα′ be defined as
Dα′ = {v ∈ D | dom(a) /∈ src(aα
′, v, s)} .
Clearly, if α′ is a prefix of α′′, then Dα′′ ⊆ Dα′ . Since u ∈ Dα, it suffices
to show that s · aα′ -Dα′ s · α
′ for all prefixes α′ of α. We show the claim
by induction. For α′ = ǫ, the claim follows from (LRi), since dom(a) 6֌s u.
Hence assume that α′ = βb for some sequence β and action b. By induction,
we have that s · aβ -Dβ s · β, where Dβ contains all agents v with dom(a) /∈
src(aβ, v, s). Now let u ∈ Dα′ , it then also follows that u ∈ Dβ. Let D′ be
defined as in the condition (SCi). Since the condition implies s·aβb -D′ s·βb,
it suffices to show that u ∈ D′. Clearly this is the case if dom(b) ∈ Dβ, i.e.,
if Dβ = D
′. Hence assume this is not the case, by definition of Dβ it then
follows that dom(a) ∈ src(aβ, dom(b), s). Since dom(a) /∈ src(aβb, u, s), this
implies that dom(b) 6֌s·aβ u, hence u ∈ D′ follows in this case as well.
For the other direction, assume that the system is i-secure. We define s -D′ t
if there is a state s˜, an action a and a sequence α, such that s = s˜·aα, t = s˜·α,
and for all u ∈ D′, we have dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s˜). We claim that this defines
an intransitive unwinding for M with respect to (֌s)s∈S . Since the system
is i-secure, the condition (OCi) is obviously satisfied. The condition (LRi)
follows from the fact that if dom(a) 6֌s u, then dom(a) /∈ src(a, u, s). It
remains to show (SCi). Hence let s -D′ t, and let s˜, a and α be chosen with
the above properties. Let b be an action, and let D′′ be the set resulting
from applying (SCi). It remains to show that for each u ∈ D′′, we have
dom(a) /∈ src(aαb, u, s˜). First assume that dom(b) ∈ D′, it then follows from
the definition of -D′ that dom(a) /∈ src(aα, dom(b), s˜), and hence dom(a) /∈
src(aαb, u, s˜). On the other hand, if dom(b) /∈ D′, then from u ∈ D′′, we know
that dom(b) 6֌s˜·aα u, and hence from dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s˜) (since u ∈ D′)
and src(aαb, u, s˜) = src(aα, u, s˜), it follows that dom(a) /∈ src(aαb, u, s˜) as
required.

7.4 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Theorem 7.1. Checking whether a system is not i-secure can be done in NP.
Proof. The algorithm simply guesses the corresponding values of a, u, s, and α,
and verifies that these satisfy obsu(s·aα) 6= obsu(s·α) and dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s)
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in the straight-forward way. To show that this gives an NP-algorithm, it suffices
to show that the length of α can be bounded polynomially in the size of the
system. We show that if the system is insecure, then α can be chosen with
|α| ≤ |S|2.
To show this, let α be a path of minimal length satisfying the above. Let
Fs and Fs·a be the finite state machines obtained when starting the system in
the states s and s · a, respectively, and let F = Fs × Fs·a, with initial state
(s, s · a). Clearly, in F , we have (s, s · a) · α = (s · α, s · aα). If |α| ≥ |S|2, then α
visits a state from F twice, i.e., α contains a nontrivial loop. Such a loop can be
removed from α without changing the states that are reached. Clearly, removing
a loop does not add information flow, hence the thus-obtained α′ also satisfies
the prerequisites for α, which is a contradiction to α’s minimality. 
Theorem 7.2. For every security definition that is at least as strict as informa-
tion-flow-security and at least as permissive as interference-security, the prob-
lem to determine whether a given system is insecure is NP-hard under ≤logm -
reductions.
·
h
u 6=0
u=0
h
u 6=1
u=1
h
u 6=2
u=2
·
h
h
h
Fig. 5. System C(u)
We reduce from the 3-colorability
problem for graphs. Let a graph G
with vertices u1, . . . , un and edges
(v11 , v
2
1), . . . , (v
m
1 , v
m
2 ) be given. We
construct a system MG as follows:
– for each vertex u, there is an
agent u with actions u=0, u=1,
and u=2, and there are agents
u 6=0, u 6=1, u 6=2, each having ex-
actly one action, which for sim-
plicity we denote with the agent’s
name. Additionally, there is an
agent h with a single action h,
and an agent L with a single ac-
tion L.
– for each vertex u, we construct
a subsystem C(u) (see Figure 5),
that models the choice of color-
ing of u in the graph. In C(u) and
all following systems, all transi-
tions that are not explicitly indicated in the graphical representation loop
in the corresponding state.
– for each edge (u, v), we construct a subsystem E(u, v) (see Figure 7), which
enforces that the colors of u and v must be different. The edges labelled with
a transition of the form u 6=i,j represent two consecutive edges, the first one
with the transition u 6=i, and the second one labelled with the transition u 6=j ,
where the policy is repeated between the two transitions.
– the system MG is now designed as shown in Figure 6. We denote the left-
most state with s0. The unlabelled arrows between the different C(u) and
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E(u, v)-nodes express that the final node of one is the starting node of the
other. The subsystems C′(u) and E′(u, v) are defined in the same way as
C(u) and E(u, v), except that here, in all states we have policies that allow
interference between any two agents. With last, we denote the final state of
E(vm1 , v
m
2 ), and with last
′, the final state of E′(vm1 , v
m
2 ). We define the obser-
vation functions as follows: obsL(last
′) = 1, and for all other combinations
of agent u and state s, obsu(s) = 0.
D \ {h}
L
C(u1) . . . C(un) E(v11 , v
1
2) . . . E(v
m
1 , v
m
2 )
h
A \ {h}
C′(u1) . . . C
′(un) E
′(v11 , v
1
2) . . . E
′(vm1 , v
m
2 )
A \ {h}
Fig. 6. Complete system MG
The main property of MG is that it is possible to find a path hα from s0 to
last that does not transmit h to L if and only if G is 3-colorable:
Definition 7.3. A path hα is hiding, if dom(h) /∈ src(hα, L, s0), and s0 · hα =
last.
Intuitively, the subsystem C(u) forces the agent u to “choose” a color i ∈
{0, 1, 2}, by performing the action u=i. For each edge (u, v) or (v, u) in which u is
involved, the agent u later repeats the same transition in the subsystem E(u, v)
(or E(v, u)). These systems ensure that no two agents that are connected with
an edge can choose the same color—if they do, then a dead-end is reached. To
ensure that agents are consistent in their choice of colors (i.e., choose the same
color in later E(u, v)-systems as in the C(u) system, and consequently chooses
the same color for each E(u, v)-system), we use the following construction: When
agent u chooses color i in C(u), the agent u 6=i “receives” interference from h. If
the agent u later claims to have a color different from i, then the only available
path is one that allows an interference between u 6=i and L, which transmits the
information about h to L.
Lemma 7.4. There is a hiding path if and only if MG is 3-colarable.
Proof. First assume that G is 3-colorable, hence let c : {u1, . . . , un} → {0, 1, 2}
be a coloring function such that for all edges (u, v) ∈ E, we have that c(u) 6= c(v).
We construct the path aα as the unique path from s0 ·a to last that starts with L,
does not use loops in any state, and where each agent u chooses the action u=c(u)
whenever the current state has more than one non-looping actions. Since c is a
3-coloring, this path does not hit a dead-end in any of the E(u, s)-systems, and in
particular, reaches the state last. Due to the construction of the path, whenever
a transaction u 6=i is performed, the action u=i has never been performed on the
path, and thus u 6=i has not received h. Hence none of the agents interfering with
L has received the action h, and thus dom(h) /∈ src(aα, L, s0), i.e., aα is hiding.
For the other direction, assume that there is a hiding path aα. Without loss
of generality, we can assume that aα does not use any actions that loop in the
20
current state. Since aα is hiding, we know that s0 ·aα = last, in particular, every
subsystem C(u) and E(u, v) is passed when following aα from s0. We can thus
define a coloring c : {u1, . . . , un} → {0, 1, 2} by c(u) = i, where i is the unique
value such that at the start of C(u), the action u=i is performed by u. We claim
that this is a 3-coloring of G.
For this, first observe that on aα, no action u=j is performed for j 6= c(u):
Due to the above, no looping action is performed. Now observe that after the
performance of u=c(u) in C(u), the agent u 6=c(u) has received the h-event. Now
after a later performance of the action u=j, every path that proceeds to last uses
a transition u 6=c(u) in a state where u 6=c(u) ֌ L, which is a contradiction to the
assumption that hα is hiding.
We now show that for each edge (u, v) of G, we have that c(u) 6= c(v).
Since aα is hiding, aα passes through the subsystem E(u, v). Due to the above,
in this subsystems the actions u=c(u) and v=c(v) are performed at the relevant
states. If c(u) and c(v) were equal, this would reach a dead-end state, which is
a contradiction, as aα is hiding, and hence s0 · aα = last. 
Since MG can clearly be constructed from G in logarithmic space, the fol-
lowing lemma now proves Theorem 7.2:
Lemma 7.5. – If G is 3-colorable, then MG is not i-secure.
– If G is not 3-colorable, then MG is i-secure.
Proof. First assume that G is 3-colorable. By Lemma 7.4, there is a hiding path
hα. In particular, s0 · hα = last. Since the action h loops in the state s0 · h, we
can without loss of generality assume that α does not start with h, and hence
s0 ·α = last
′. Since hα is hiding, we know that dom(h) /∈ src(hα, L, s0). Since in
s0, there is no outgoing edge from h, we also know that dom(h)
s0
↓ ∩src(α,L, s0) =
∅. Since obsL(last) 6= obsL(last′), it follows that the MG is not i-secure.
Now assume that G is not 3-colorable, and indirectly assume that MG is not
i-secure. Since L is the only agent whose observation function is not constant,
this implies that there is a state s, an action a, and a sequence α such that
dom(a) /∈ src(aα, L, s) and obsL(s · aα) 6= obsL(s · α). Since last′ is the only
state with an observation different from 0, we know that last′ ∈ {s · aα, s · α}.
In particular, s is an ancestor of last′ in MG. Since dom(a) /∈ src(aα, L, s), we
know that in particular, dom(a) 6֌s L. Since the only ancestor state of last′ in
which the local policy is not the complete relation is s0, we know that s = s0.
Since in s0, all agents except for h may interfere with L, we also know that a = h.
Since s0 · hα 6= last′ for any α, we know that s0 · α = last′. From the design of
MG, it follows that s0 · hα = last. Since h /∈ src(hα, L, s0), it follows that hα is
hiding, and thus Lemma 7.4, implies that G is 3-colorable as required. 
We now prove the FPT result, from which the case for a logarithmic number
of agents immediately follows:
Proof. It clearly suffices to provide an FPT algorithm. Such an algorithm can
be obtained by the standard dynamic programming approach, by first creating
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a table with an entry for every choice s, t and D′, that indicates whether s -D′ t
has already been established. The size of the table is 2|D| · |S|2. Now initialize
the table with |S| · |A| operations (using the (LRi) property), and use the (SCi)
condition to add entries to the table until no changes are performed anymore.
Then the condition (OCi) can be verified by checking, for each agent u, and each
set D′ for which u ∈ D′, whether for all s -D′ t, we have obsu(s) = obsu(t).
For each choice of u and D′, this requires |S|2 accesses to the table. Since the
access to the table can be implemented in time 2|D| ·poly|M |, this completes the
proof. 
7.5 Proof of Theorem 4.9
Proof. Clearly, if M is not i-secure with respect to (֌s)s∈S , then M is also
not i-secure with respect to (֌′s)s∈S . Using induction, we can assume that
(֌′s)s∈S arose from (֌s)s∈S by removing a single intransitively useless edge
e. Assume that M is not i-secure with respect to (֌′s)s∈S . Hence there are
a ∈ A, αinA∗, s ∈ S, u ∈ D such that dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s) (with respect to
(֌′s)s∈S) and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α). Since M is i-secure, we know that
dom(a) ∈ src(aα, u, s) (with respect to (֌s)s∈S). In particular, we know that
s ·aα 6֌u s ·α. It follows thtat e is not intransitively useless, a contradiction. 
7.6 Proof of Theorem 4.12
The proof of this theorem highlights an interesting difference between intransitive
noninterference with a global policy (IP-security) and with local policies: It can
easily be shown (see [E+11]) that if a system is not IP-secure, then there exist a
“witness” for the insecurity consisting of a state s, an agent u, an action a, and
a sequence α such that
1. dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u) and obsu(s ·aα) 6= obsu(s ·α) (i.e., these values demon-
strate insecurity of the system), and
2. α contains no b with dom(a)֌ dom(b).
Intuitively, this means that to verify insecurity, it suffices to consider se-
quences in which the “secret” action a is not transmitted even one step. This fea-
ture is crucial for the polynomial-time algorithm in [E+11] to verify IP-security.
In a setting with local policies, the situation is different, the above-mentioned
property does not hold. This is in fact the key reason why no “small” unwinding
for i-security exists, and why the verification problem is NP-hard. However, in
systems with a uniform policy, we again can prove an analogous property, even
though the proof is more complicated than for the setting with a global policy:
Lemma 7.6. Let M be a system with a policy that is intransitively uniform.
Then M is i-secure if and only if there are a, u, s, and α with dom(a) /∈
src(aα, u, s), obsu(s ·α) 6= obsu(s ·aα), and no b with dom(a)֌s dom(b) appears
in α.
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Proof. Clearly if such a, u, s, and α exist, then the system is not i-secure. For
the converse, let α be of minimal length such that there exist u, s, and a with
dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s) and obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(a · α). Indirectly, assume that
α = βbβ′ for some b with dom(a)֌s dom(b). We consider three cases.
– Assume obsu(s·aβbβ
′) 6= obsu(s·aββ
′). Note that dom(b) /∈ src(bβ′, u, s·aβ).
Hence choosing s′ = s · aβ, a′ = b, and α′ = β′ is a contradiction to the
minimality of α.
– Assume obsu(s · βbβ′) 6= obsu(s · ββ′). To show that this again is a con-
tradiction to the minimality of α (starting in the state s · β), it suffices to
show that dom(b) /∈ src(bβ′, u, s ·β). Hence, indirectly assume that dom(b) ∈
src(bβ′, u, s ·β), and let γ be a minimal prefix of bβ′ such that there is some
agent v with
• dom(b) ∈ src(γ, v, s · β),
• dom(a) /∈ src(aβγ, v, s).
Since choosing v = u and γ = β′ satisfies these conditions, such a minimal
γ exists. Again, consider the point where v “learns” that a was performed,
i.e., let γ = πcπ′ with
• dom(b) ∈ src(π, dom(c), s · β), and
• dom(c)֌s·βπ v.
Since dom(a) /∈ src(a · βγ, v, s), and π is a prefix of γ, the prerequisites to
the lemma imply that v↑s·aβπ = v
↑
s·βπ, in particular, dom(c) ֌s·aβπ v. Since
dom(a) /∈ src(aβγ, v, s), this implies
dom(a) /∈ src(aβπ, dom(c), s),
hence we have a contradiction to the minimality of γ.
– Assume obsu(s · aβbβ′) = obsu(s · aββ′) and obsu(s · βbβ′) = obsu(s ·
ββ′). Since obsu(s · aβbβ′) 6= obsu(s · βbβ′), this implies obsu(s · aββ′) 6=
obsu(s · ββ′). To obtain a contradiction to the minimality of α, it suffices to
show that dom(a) /∈ src(aββ′, u, s). Hence, indirectly assume that dom(a) ∈
src(aββ′, u, s), and let γ be a minimal prefix of β′ such that there is an
agent v with
• dom(a) /∈ src(aβbγ, v, s), and
• dom(a) ∈ src(aβγ, v, s).
Since choosing v = u and γ = β′ satisfies these conditions, such a minimal
γ exists. Now consider the step where v “learns” a, which clearly happens
inside γ (as dom(a) /∈ src(aβbγ, v, s)). Hence γ = πcπ′ with
• dom(a) ∈ src(aβπ, dom(c), s), and
• dom(c)֌s·aβπ v.
Since dom(a) /∈ src(aβbγ, v, s), we have dom(b) /∈ src(bγ, v, s · aβ). Since
π is a prefix of γ, this implies dom(b) /∈ src(bπ, v, s · aβ). The conditions
of the lemma this imply that v↑s·aβbπ = v
↑
s·aβπ. In particular, this implies
dom(c) ֌s·aβbπ v. Since dom(a) /∈ src(aβbγ, v, s), this implies dom(a) /∈
src(aβbπ, dom(c), s), which is a contradiction to the minimality of γ.

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We now show a similar fact which allows us to easily verify whether a policy
is intransitively uniform: To verify uniformity, it again suffices to consider action
sequences in which the “secret” action is not even transmitted a single step. This
is shown in the following Lemma:
Lemma 7.7. If a policy for a system is not intransitively uniform, there is an
agent u, an action a, a sequence α, and a state s such that
1. dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s),
2. u֋s·aα 6= u
֋
s·α,
and contains no b with dom(a)֌s dom(b).
Proof. Choose u, a, s, and α such that |α| is minimal, and indirectly assume
that α = βbβ′ for some sequences β and β′, where dom(a)֌s dom(b). Note that
this implies
dom(b) /∈ src(bβ′, u, s · aβ),
which we will use throughout the proof. We consider three cases:
– Assume that u֋s·aβbβ′ 6= u
֋
s·aββ′ . We choose s
′ = s · aβ, a′ = b, and α′ = β′.
This is a contradiction to the minimality of α, since |α′| < |β′|.
– Assume that u֋s·βbβ′ 6= u
֋
s·ββ′. We choose s
′ = s · β, a′ = b, and α = β′
and obtain a contradiction in the same way as in the above case. For this,
it suffices to prove that dom(b) /∈ src(bβ′, u, s · β). Hence assume indirectly
that dom(b) ∈ src(bβ′, u, s · β). Let γ be a minimal prefix of bβ′ such that
there is an agent v with
• dom(b) ∈ src(γ, v, s · β),
• dom(a) /∈ src(aβγ, v, s).
Since γ = bβ′ and v = u satisfies these conditions, such a minimal choice of γ
and v exists. Now consider the position where v “learns” b, i.e., let γ = πcπ′
such that the action c transmits the b-action to v, i.e., we have that
• dom(b) ∈ src(π, dom(c), s · β),
• dom(c)֌s·βπ v.
Note that π is a proper prefix of γ. Since dom(a) /∈ src(aβγ, v, s), it follows
that dom(a) /∈ src(aβπ, v, s). Hence we know by the minimality of α that
v↑s·βπ = v
↑
s·aβπ, In particular, dom(c)֌s·aβπ v. We now have the following:
• Due to the above, we know that dom(b) ∈ src(π, dom(c), s · β),
• since dom(a) /∈ src(aβγ, v, s), we know that dom(a) /∈ src(aβπ, dom(c), s).
Since π is a proper prefix of γ, this is a contradiction to the minimality of γ.
– Assume that u֋s·aβbβ′ = u
֋
s·aββ′ and u
֋
s·βbβ′ = u
֋
s·ββ′. Since u
֋
s·aβbβ′ 6= u
֋
s·βbβ′ ,
it then follows that u֋s·aββ′ 6= u
֋
s·ββ′. It suffices to show that dom(a) /∈
src(aββ′, u, s), we then have a contradiction to the minimality of α. Hence
indirectly assume that dom(a) ∈ src(aββ′, u, s). Let γ be a minimal prefix
of β′ such that there is some v such that
• dom(a) /∈ src(aβbγ, v, s),
• dom(a) ∈ src(aβγ, v, s).
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Since γ = β′ and v = u satisfy these conditions, such a minimal choice
exists. Similarly as before, look at the action where a is forwared to v, i.e.,
let γ = πcπ′ such that
• dom(a) ∈ src(aβπ, dom(c), s),
• dom(c)֌s·aβπ v.
Since dom(a) /∈ src(aβbγ, v, s) and dom(a)֌s dom(b), it follows that dom(b) /∈
src(bγ, v, s·aβ). Since π is a prefix of γ, this implies dom(b) /∈ src(bπ, v, s·aβ).
The minimality of α implies that v↑s·aβbπ = v
↑
s·aβπ, in particular, dom(c)֌s·aβbπ
v. Since dom(a) /∈ src(aβbγ, v, s), we obtain
• dom(a) /∈ src(aβbπ, dom(c), s),
• from the above, we know that dom(a) ∈ src(aβπ, dom(c), s).
This contradicts the minimality of γ, since π is a proper prefix of γ.

Using these lemmas, we can now prove Theorem 4.12:
Proof. 1. First assume that there is a uniform intransitive unwinding satisfy-
ing (PCui ), (SC
u
i ), and (LR
u
i ), and indirectly assume that the policy is not
intransitively uniform. Due to Lemma 7.7, there exist a, u, s, and α such
that dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s), u֋s·aα 6= u
֋
s·α, and α does not contain any b with
dom(a)֌s dom(b). Let v = dom(a). Let ∼s,vu be an equivalence relation sat-
isfying (PCui ), (SC
u
i ), and (LR
u
i ). It suffices to show that s · aα ∼
s,v
u s · α to
obtain a contradiction to (PCui ).
Clearly, dom(a) 6֌s u, hence (LRui ) implies s ∼
s,dom(a)
u s · a, i.e., ss,vu s · a.
Note that for all a′ appearing in α, we have that dom(a) 6֌s dom(a
′). Hence
applying (SCui ) for each a
′, we obtain s · aα ∼s,vu s · α as required.
For the converse, assume that for all dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s), we have that
u֋s·aα = u
֋
s·α, and let s0 be a state, and let v and u be agents. We define
s ∼s0,vu t iff for all sequences α that contain no b with v ֌s0
dom(b), we have u֋s·α = u
֋
t·α.
Clearly, ∼s0,vu is an equivalence relation and satisfies (PC
u
i ) (choose α = ǫ).
For showing (SCui ), let s ∼
s0,v
u t, and let v 6֌s0 dom(a). To show the required
condition s · a ∼s0,vu t · a, let α be a sequence containing no b with v֌s0 b.
Since v 6֌s0 dom(a), the sequence aα satisfies the same condition, and hence
from s ∼s0,vu t, it follows that u
֋
s·aα = v
↑
s·aα as required.
Finally, consider (LRui ). Let dom(a) 6֌s u. To show that s ∼
s,dom(a)
u s · a,
let α be such that no b with dom(a) ֌s dom(b) appears in α, we need to
show that u֋s·α = u
֋
s·aα. This follows from the prerequites, since clearly,
dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s).
2. (a) Assume that the system is i-secure. Let s0 be a state, and let v and u
be agents. We define:
s ∼s0,vu t iff for all sequences α that contain no b with v ֌s0
dom(b), we have obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α).
Clearly, ∼s0,vu is an equivalence relation and satisfies (OC
u
i ) (choose α =
ǫ). For showing (SCui ), let s ∼
s0,v
u t, and let a ∈ A with v 6֌s0 dom(a).
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We need to show that for all α containing no b with v ֌s0 dom(b), we
have obsu(s · aα) = obsu(t · aα). This trivially follows from s ∼s0,vu t,
since α′ = aα also does not contain a b with v֌s0 dom(b).
Finally, consider (LRui ). Let dom(a) 6֌s u. We need to show that s ∼
s,dom(a)
u
s · a. Hence let α be a sequence containing no b with dom(a)֌s dom(b).
We need to show that obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · aα). Since the system
is i-secure, it suffices to show that dom(a) /∈ src(aα, u, s). This fol-
lows trivially since dom(a) 6֌s u, and α does not contain any b with
dom(a)֌s dom(b).
(b) Assume that the system is not i-secure. Due to Lemma 7.6, there is
a state s, an agent u, an action a and a sequence α with dom(a) /∈
src(aα, u, s), obsu(s · aα) 6= obsu(s · α), and α does not contain any b
with dom(a)֌s dom(b). Let v = dom(a), and let ∼s,vu be an equivalence
relation on S that satisfies (OCui ), (SC
u
i ), and (LR
u
i ). It suffices to show
that sα ∼s,vu s · aα. Clearly we have that v 6֌s u. Therefore, (recall
that v = dom(a)), (LRui ) implies s ∼
s,v
u s · a. Note that for all b ∈ α,
we have that dom(a) 6֌s dom(b). Hence applying (SCui ) repeatedly, we
obtain s · aα ∼s,vu s · α, which completes the proof.

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